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1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

involves not an examination of the facts to find an actual abuse of
insider status, but rather an inquiry to determine whether abuses
could have taken place,' the aggressor cannot mold the transactions
to insure that § 16(b) will not apply. In short, the courts' adoption of
the subjective approach, while preventing undue hardship in some
the uncertainty surrounding the applicases, probably has increased
82
cation of the section.

VIII. BROKER-DEALER REGULATION
A.
(1).

The Reasonable Basis Doctrine

Introduction

To further the Securities Exchange Act's goal of providing open
and fair securities markets,' the SEC and the courts have scrutinized
the information given a customer by a broker-dealer when recommending2 a security by the strict standards of the reasonable basis
doctrine. The test provides that a broker-dealer may not
recommend a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for such recommendation. He must disclose facts
which he knows and those which are reasonably ascertainable.
By his recommendation he implies that a reasonable investigation has been made and that his recommendation rests on the
conclusions based on such investigation. Where the salesman
lacks essential information about a security, he should disclose
well as the risks which arise from his lack of informathis as
3
tion .

See notes 64 supra.
It should be pointed out, however, that even if all the courts excluded some
transactions from § 16(b)'s scope, the transactions could give rise to Rule 10b-5 claims,
which are decided under rules as complex and uncertain as the Kern possibility of
abuse test. American Standard Inc. v. Crane Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,924 (2d
Cir. Dec. 20, 1974).
1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).
To recommend means to suggest affirmatively, Lipton, Rule 10b-5: The End of
Isolation and New Thresholds of Materiality, in PRACTCING LAW INsTrmT, SIxTH
ANNUAL INsTTrE ON SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 311, 326-27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Lipton], or to present with approval or as favored by the person making the recommendation. Rice, Recommendations by a Broker-Dealer:The Requirement for a Reasonable Basis, 25 MERCER L. REv. 537, 548 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rice].
3 Hanly 4. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969), citing SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 6721 at 3 (Feb. 2, 1962). See also Jacobs, The Impact of Securities
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 869, 882 (1972)
2
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The duty created by the reasonable basis doctrine only applies when
a broker-dealer recommends a security. Mere solicitation and less
affirmative broker-dealer actions are not governed by the rule.
(2). Broker-Dealer Action Governed by the Reasonable Basis
Doctirne.
The 1974 decision Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co.5 illustrates the
limits of the reasonable basis doctrine. A brokerage firm, J. B. Williams & Co. offered to sell shares of a small corporation to the plaintiff Canizaro. Attracted by the offer, which expired within twentyfour hours, the plaintiff immediately telephoned an employee of the
defendant Kohlmeyer & Co. to inquire whether Kohlmeyer could
handle the transaction and could provide answers to some questions
concerning the seller and the shares involved in the proposed sale.
After determining the answers to the plaintiff's questions, the employee called the plaintiff to report that Kohlmeyer could carry out
the transaction and, that based on the information which he had
obtained, there was no reason not to make the purchase. The plaintiff
then authorized the transaction.' When the stock later became worthless, the plaintiff sued Kohlmeyer under Rule 10b-5 for failing to
ascertain and disclose all the material facts which allegedly
would
7
have shown the speculative nature of the investment.
The Canizaro court found for the defendant Kohlmeyer, noting
that the plaintiff had defined the scope of the employee's investigation by requesting answers to specific questions and by imposing a
twenty-four hour limit on the research. Further, in replying to the
plaintiff's questions, the employee gave accurate information, provided no investment opinion, and did not actually recommend the
purchase.' The court concluded that the duty under the reasonable
[hereinafter cited as Jacobs]; Rice, supra note 2, at 546-47.
1 Solicitation occurs when a broker-dealer merely contacts a customer to see if he
is interested in purchasing a particular security without affirmatively suggesting that

the customer buy. Lipton, supra note 1, at 326-27. There is, however, a large gray area
between a recommendation and a solicitation. See, Jacobs, supra note 3, at 882.
5370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974), app. pndg., 5th Cir., CCH FED.

SEC.

L. REP.

73,031.
1 Id. at 283-85.
7 The

bases of the plaintiff's Rule 10b-5 claim were that the defendant's employee

failed to check pink sheet market information before a certain date (failure to investi-

gate leading to failure to state material facts) and also failed to report to the plaintiff
that J. B. Williams & Company had ceased dealing with the public possibly due to
SEC action (failure to state a known material fact). 370 F. Supp. at 285-86.

1 Id. at 288-89. The court also noted that the plaintiff was an experienced trader
in speculative securities. Id. at 283.

1975]

1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

basis doctrine to research and disclose all material facts should not
apply to broker-dealer services which consisted merely of carrying out
the customer's instructions and which involved no recommendation
by the defendant.
(3). Duty to Educate.
A second recent case reveals the potential importance of full, understanable disclosure when a broker-dealer does recommend a security. The plaintiff in Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co.I was a longstanding
customer of the defendant broker-dealer who usually relied heavily
on the defendant's recommendations. Pursuant to established custom, the defendant's employee telephoned the plaintiff on several
occasions to recommend the purchase of various speculative securities which the plaintiff in turn bought. Following the requirements
of Rule 15cl-4,"1 the defendant sent the plaintiff a confirmation slip
after each purchase. Noted on the face of the slip was a coded indication" that the defendant broker-dealer was selling the stock from his
own inventory and was therefore a principal in the sales transaction.
2
Plaintiff was not otherwise notified of this conflict of interests.1
When the recommended investments declined in value, the plaintiff
filed an action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act alleging that the defendant's disclosure of material facts was inadequate.
The Cant court found that the coded indication of the defendant's
principal status was not sufficient to meet Rule 15cl-4's disclosure
requirement and held A.G. Becker liable for violating § 10(b).11 Considersing the plaintiffs heavy reliance on the defendant's recommendations and the long relationship between the parties, the court concluded that the defendant had a duty to "adequately and clearly
inform or educate the investor" of its principal status so that the
plaintiff could make a "properly informed investment decision."' 4
The court was careful to note, however, that the imposition of a duty
to educate was limited to cases which involved "a special relationship
of confidence."

15

CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,747 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
0 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-4 (1974).
" The code was briefly explained on the reverse side of the confirmation slip. CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,747, at 96,476.
12 Id. at 96,475-77.
11Id. at 96,479. Rule 10b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-3 (1974), read in conjunction with
Rule 15cl-4 makes unlawful the sale of the securities sold in Cant without disclosure
of the defendant's principal status.
11CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,747, at 96,479.
1

IsId.
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Although the Cant decision did not involve the reasonable basis
doctrine, the controlling principles in the case could be extended to
require a broker-dealer to educate his customer to the meaning and
significance of the facts which he discloses when recommending a
security."6 Such an extension would be consistent with the general
policy behind the strict judicial standards for judging recommendations. 7 It is unclear, however, whether courts which might incorporate a duty to educate into the reasonable basis doctrine would confine the duty to cases such as Cant which involve longstanding, heavy
reliance on the broker-dealer's recommendations. Arguably, a duty to
educate all customers is inherent in the standards created by the
reasonable basis and suitability doctrines, 8 and in the goals of the
1934 Act. When a broker-dealer discloses material facts in connection
with his recommendation of a security, the duty under the suitability
doctrine to consider his customer's special needs could be interpreted
to require that the broker-dealer phrase his disclosure of material
facts in a manner understandable to his customer so that the investor
may make an informed decision. However, whether the courts will
impose a duty to educate in all or even limited circumstances is very
uncertain."'

(4).

Conflict of Duties and the "Chinese Wall."

More complex issues arise when a broker-dealer's duty to a customer under the reasonable basis doctrine conflicts with a concurrent
duty to another client not to disclose inside information. 21 Such a
11The reasonable basis doctrine provides that "a recommendation should not be
made without disclosure of material facts, known or reasonably ascertainable bearing
upon the justification for the recommendation." BROKER DEALER MODEL COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM ADVISORY COMM., SEC GUIDE TO BROKER-DEALER COMPLIANCE 146 (Preliminary Draft 1974) (citations omitted).
,1 See CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,747, at 96,478-79; Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
11Briefly, the suitability doctrine provides that a broker-dealer must "elicit data
concerning his customer's investment objectives and financial needs, and, after investigation of the issuer, . . . recommend only those securities he believe[s] to be consistent with those objectives and needs." Jacobs, supra note 85, at 897.
"1But cf. Stevens v. Abbot, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968)
(churning case in which broker-dealer was held liable where plaintiff, ignorant of
securities matters, was not told of the risk that changing an inactive account to an
active one might not increase income).
The courts have held that:

[Alnyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing
it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or if he chooses not to do
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conflict2 1 of duties arose in the 1974 case Slade v. Shearson,Hammill
& Co., in which the broker-dealer department of the defendant firm
recommended 22 the securities of a corporation which was a client of
the firm's investment banking department. The Slade plaintiffs alleged that the broker-dealer department promoted the purchase of
shares of Tidal Marine Corporation while the investment banking
department had adverse, material, inside information showing Tidal
Marine to be in financial difficulty.? Shearson, Hammill contended,
however, that even if one department did have such adverse information,24 it was precluded from either revealing or acting on the information until the client made the information public.? The question
presented by the case, therefore, was whether "an investment
banker/securities broker who receives adverse material nonpublic information about an investment banking client [is] precluded from
soliciting 2 customers for that client's securities on the basis of public
information which (because of its possession of inside information) it
knows to be false or misleading. ' 27 The district court refused Shearson, Hammill's motion for summary judgment, finding that the defendant had a duty not to recommend securities while in possession
so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
94,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
26 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment), remanded for trial, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,914 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 1974) (declined to hear an interlocutory appeal
from district court's denial of summary judgment).
21 See notes 2 & 4 supra.
21[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,329, at 95,131.
2' Shearson, Hammill contended alternatively that the firm did not have the
adverse information at the time of the sales to the plaintiffs. The court, examining the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, rejected this contention in view
of the plaintiffs' assertion that Shearson,Hammill did have some adverse information
on the sales dates. Id.
2 The fact situation poses thorny problems because if the defendant withdrew its.
recommendation on the basis of material inside information, it might breach its duty
of confidence to the investment banking client as well as violate the rule set out in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969). See Lipton, supra note 2, at 336.
26 "The use of the work 'soliciting' in the certified question is unfortunate ....
[I]t is clear from the records and the briefs that the word was used in the sense of
the securities firm having affirmatively 'suggested' and 'recommended' the purchase
[of the Tidal Marine shares]." Lipton, supra note 2, at 326-27.
2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,914, at 97,126 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 1974) (question
certified on interlocutory appeal).
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of adverse inside information.2
As the district court recognized, 9 solving the conflicting duties
problem involves a careful balancing of the various interests of the
securities customer, the investment banking client, and the brokerdealer. Under the reasonable basis doctrine, the broker-dealer has a
duty to the customer to acquire and disclose all reasonably ascertainable material information."° To recommend a security on the basis of
information known to be false is a violation of Rule 10b-5 and common law fraud." On the other hand, the investment banker has a
duty not to disclose confidential information entrusted to it by a
client.3 2 The most direct method of removing this conflict would require a division of the investment banking and broker-dealer departments into two separate business entities.3 3 However, such an approach overlooks the advantages which accompany the unification of
the two functionally distinct departments in one firm. 4 An alternative solution is the creation of a "Chinese Wall" 5 between the broker28 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,329, at 95,132
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1974). The court relied on the general rule set out in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
21 [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,329, at 95,132.
31 See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
31See, e.g., Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr.
157 (1968). In that case, an employee of Shearson, Hammill had access to inside
information which contradicted the press releases which were the basis for the defendant's favorable recommendations. The court held the defendant liable for common
law fraud, noting:
[W]e have been given insufficient reason for permitting a person to
avoid one fiduciary obligation by accepting another which conflicts
with it. . . .The officer-director's conflicting duties is the classic
problem encountered by one who serves two masters. It should not be
resolved by weighing the conflicting duties; it should be avoided in
advance ....
72 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
See Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267
(July 29, 1971); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
13 See Bernstein, Securities-ClassActions-Beyond Texas Gulf, N.Y.L.J. Jan.
28, 1974, at 4, col. 5.
1 Cf. Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the
"Wall", 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 21, 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Herman &
Safanda].
15In this context, a Chinese Wall is a system of internal control which regulates
the flow of information between the broker-dealer and investment banking departments of a securities firm. See Herman & Safanda, supra note 34, at 21. The SEC
seems to have approved the theory behind the Chinese Wall. Lipton, supra note 2, at
315-18.
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dealer and investment banking departments. Although originally
designed to prevent the broker-dealer department from making recommendations on the basis of inside information," the Chinese Wall
could be used to isolate each department according to its separate
function.
Such informational isolation would be consistent with the duties
which the firm owes both its customers purchasing securities and its
investment banking clients. By not allowing the investment banking
department to reveal any non-public information, the firm preserves
the client's confidence. Moreover, since material inside information,
whether favorable or adverse, would not pass to the broker-dealer
department, any recommendations of that department would be
based on public information. The broker-dealer department's customers, therefore, would receive both the same data available to all
investors37 and a recommendation based on the same facts underlying
the recommendations of other broker-dealers.38
Nevertheless, some commentators have urged that even where
there is an effective Chinese Wall, a firm's broker-dealer department
should not recommend the purchase of securities of any corporation
which uses the firm's investment banking services. It is argued that
to allow one part of a firm to suggest the purchase of a security on
the basis of favorable public information while another department
is in possession of adverse inside information would institutionalize
action constituting common law fraud." Such an approach would
restrict the broker-dealer department to a neutral position on securities of an issuer advised by the investment banking department.
The argument that a securities firm should be limited to solicita3 See e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
232 (2d Cir. 1974).

1 Lipton, supra note 2, at 333.
' An investor could not successfully sue a broker-dealer for failure to make a
recommendation based upon material inside information in violation of Rule 10b-5.
See Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 (July
29, 1971) (reprinted at [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,163,
at 80,522 (SEC July 29, 1971).
3' Both the SEC and the Solomon Brothers amicus briefs in the Slade case urged
the adoption of restricted lists which prohibit recommending the shares of a company
using the firm's investment department. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., CCH FED.
SEC. L. Rae. 94,914, at 97,129 (2d Cir. Dec. 16,1974). Another commentator has taken
essentially the same approach, arguing that the firm should be required to maintain a
neutral stance on the securities of the companies it advises. See Lipton, supra note 2,
at 336.
40Lipton, supra note 2, at 343.
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tion,41 however, appears to overlook reasons for allowing the brokerdealer department to recommend the investment banking client's
securities. 2 Moreover, it would seem inconsistent to advocate the
construction of a Chinese Wall and yet assert that a broker-dealer
department recommendation conflicting with the investment banking department's confidential information is fraudulent. Since an
effective Chinese Wall would prevent the flow of nonpublic information, the normal presumption that one part of a firm has information
known to another part should not apply. 3 If the firm actually does
control the internal flow of information, the two elements of fraud, a
recommendation and information showing the recommendation to be
misleading,44 would not converge because the department making the
recommendation would never have information showing the recommendation to be false or misleading. Arguably, therefore, to allow the
defense of an effective Chinese Wall" in a Slade conflict of duties case
would best protect the interests of the securities customer, the investment banking client, and the securities firm.

4 Solicitation, as opposed to recommendation, does not involve a broker-dealer's
affirmatively suggesting the purchase of a security. See notes 2 & 4 supra.
42 See Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,914, at
97,129 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 1974) (citing amicus brief of Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc.); Note, 27 VAND. L. REV. 815, 824-25 (1974).
13 The rule that notice to an agent (an employee of the investment banking department) is notice to the principal (the securities firm) "rests upon the presumption that
the agent will communicate to the corporation the facts learned by him, as it is his
duty to it, and whether he performs such duty or not, the corporation is bound." 3 W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 790, at 25. (Perm. ed.

rev. repl. 1965) (footnote omitted). The Chinese Wall makes it the duty of investment
banking department employees not to transmit material information to other departments of the firm. Moreover, an effective wall prevents such transfer. Therefore, the
presumed knowledge rule should give way to the reality of information isolation if the
broker-dealer can prove that his wall is effective.
" See Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157
(1968).
"5The courts would carefully examine defenses asserting that inside information
did not pass among the various parts of a firm. Investors Management Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267 n.28 (July 28, 1971).
[T]he obvious corollary of the Commission's decision is that if it were
proven after "close scrutiny" that there had in fact been no "internal
communication of material non-public information" within the
firm-as by a scrupulously observed "Chinese Wall"-then there
would be no "tippee" liability: It would have been conclusively demonstrated that the inside information had not been used.
Lipton, supra note 84, at 330-31. See also Note, 27 VAND. L. REV. 815, 825 (1974).
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B.

Broker-Dealer Duty to Supervise Employees

Although a plaintiff may rely upon several theories to hold a
broker-dealer liable for the acts of its employees, the two most commonly utilized are respondeat superior and the controlling persons
provisions of the securities acts. 6 In the past, the courts have divided
on the question of whether a plaintiff could establish on the basis of
respondeat superior broker-dealer liability for the federal securities
acts violations of its employees. 7 The great majority of courts, however, have allowed the plaintiff to proceed under both theories, 8 and
the 1974 cases followed this trend. 9
In applying the controlling persons provision of the 1934 Act, §
20(a), the courts have followed strictly5 the section's requirements
that an employer act in good faith and not directly or indirectly
induce the employee's violations.5 ' In applying the good faith standard to specific fact situations, the courts have relied on objective
measures." Therefore, in SEC v. Lum's, Inc.," the court examined
" See Note, The "Controlling Persons"Liability of Broker-Dealersfor Their Employees' Federal Securities Violations, 1974 DUKE L. J. 824, 825-26 [hereinafter cited
as Controlling Persons Liability]. The federal securities laws provisions include § 15
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 770 (1970), and § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)

(1970).
" Compare Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1209-13 (D. Md.
1968), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970) (adopted respondeat
superior in case involving § 12(2) of the 1933 Act) with SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (district court refused to apply respondeat superior theory
in suit involving § 10(b) of the 1934 Act.). See ControllingPersonsLiability, supra note
46, at 832-38; Comment, The ControllingPersonsProvisions: Conduits of Secondary
Liability Under FederalSecurities Law, 19 VmL. L. REv. 621, 626-31 (1974).
"Most courts allow the plaintiff to proceed under either theory. E.g., Sennott v.
Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 38-39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689, 694-97 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
" Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 113, 116-19 (5th Cir. 1974); Fey v. Walston & Co.,
493 F.2d 1036, 1051-53 (7th Cir. 1974); Isaacs v. Chartered New England Corp., 378 F.
Supp. 370, 374 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
-"See, e.g., SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986-87 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 880 (1972); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738-39 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
", "[To satisfy the requirement of good faith it is necessary for the defendants
to show that some precautionary measures were taken to prevent the injury suffered."
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 732-33 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See SEC v. Lum's Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1046, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
52 See Controlling PersonsLiability, supra note 46, at 839-44.
365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the firm's internal control procedures54 to decide whether the defendant Lehman Brothers was liable under § 20(a) for the Rule 10b-5
violations of its employee and found the procedures strict enough to
meet the good faith standard.5 The objective test was similarly used
in the recent case Barthe v. Rizzo,56 in which the district court held
a broker-dealer not liable as a controlling person after proof of the
defendant's use of procedures similar to those approved in Lum's. 7
When a court finds that a broker-dealer has not maintained adequate supervision over persons it controls, however, the question arises whether the broker-dealer may rely on defenses other than its
own good faith. In the 1974 case Bird v. Ferry," a securities salesman
for Robinson-Humphrey Company, the defendant broker-dealer, was
also an advisor to the plaintiff investment club. When the employee
Ferry was hired by Robinson-Humphrey, he brought the club's account with him and put it in his own name. Subsequently, and contrary to the club's instructions, he used the account for his own speculation and lost all of the club's assets. 5 When the club discovered
these speculations, it sued Robinson-Humphrey under § 20(a). The
district court found for the club."0
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Robinson-Humphrey contended
that because the plaintiff club did not exercise even cursory supervision over its account,"1 it should not be allowed recovery. The Fifth
Circuit rejected this contention and affirmed the district court decision, holding that the trial court's finding that the club exercised
-" Lehman Brothers maintained a compliance department staffed by attorneys
who met with the broker-dealer salesmen to discuss problems of inside information.
Moreover, Lehman circulated memoranda, guideline books and a video taped program
to keep its employees abreast with Rule lOb-5's requirements. 365 F. Supp. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
'6 384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
'z The court's analysis involved two inquiries: first, did the broker-dealer, Kern
Securities Co., actually know of the employee's conduct which violated Rule 10b-5;
second, were its control procedures sufficient to demonstrate § 20(a) good faith. Finding that Kern had no knowledge of the violating transaction, the court turned to Kern's
control procedures, which included a rule requiring the company's president to review
private financing deals and distributions of rules and regulations pertaining to the
securities laws. The district judge found that although these controls were not as
extensive as those employed by Lehman Brothers, see note 54 supra, they were sufficient to meet Kern's burden of showing good faith under § 20(a). 384 F. Supp. 106870.
497 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 114-16 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
55Id. at 113, 116.
SI In its recitation of the facts, the dissent listed several instances of the club's
alleged lack of care in supervising its account. Id. at 115-16.
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sufficient care was not clearly incorrect. 2 The dissent, on the other
hand, questioned the finding that the plaintiff had acted diligently
in discovering the employee's fraud. However, as support for its contention that the plaintiff's lack of diligence should relieve RobinsonHumphrey of § 20(a) liability,63 the dissent relied on a Rule 10b-5
suit6" which had denied a plaintiff recovery since it failed to show due
care in detecting the acts giving rise to the suit.5 Yet because neither
the majority nor the dissent in Bird rejected the lack of due diligence
argument as an improper defense to § 20(a) liability, the decision
could be interpreted as allowing a court to balance a broker-dealer's
lack of supervision over an employee who violated the 1934 Act
against a plaintiff's lack of care in overseeing his account.6 Such an
interpretation, however, is not required either by the provisions of §
20(a) or by the language of the opinion.
Section 20(a) imposes liability when a person controlled by the
firm violates the 1934 Act. By definition, therefore, a § 20(a) case
must include a determination of whether the controlled person violated one of the Act's provisions. In Bird, the employee allegedly
violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by converting the club's account. 7
Robinson-Humphrey's contention that the club was not sufficiently
careful, therefore, should be read as a defense addressed to the §
10(b) claim which underlay the § 20(a) allegation, and not to the
controlling persons claim alone. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the language of § 20(a) which indicates that the only
proper inquiries once an Exchange Act violation is shown are whether
the violator was a controlled person and whether the broker-dealer
exercised good faith. 9
62

Id. at 114.
Id. at 117-18.

Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 988 (1971).
See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230-31 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
" Though the majority opinion is not clear, implicit in its holding was a finding
that Robinson-Humphrey did not sufficiently supervise its employees during Ferry's
employment. 497 F.2d at 114.
"Id. at 113, 115-16.
" See cases cited in notes 64-65 supra.
" See note 52 supra.
"

